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_____________ 
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_____________ 
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v. 
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                                         Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 07-cr-00483-001) 
District Judge:  Hon. Yvette Kane 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 14, 2011 
 
Before:   FISHER, JORDAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 15, 2011) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Robert B. Blakeslee (“Blakeslee”) appeals both the decision of the 
United States District Court of the Middle District of Pennsylvania rejecting his plea 
agreement and the Court’s subsequent order sentencing him to the upper end of the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”) range without 
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according him any reduction for acceptance of responsibility.  For the following reasons, 
we will affirm.    
I. Background 
The South Williamsport Police had information that someone was illegally 
entering the premises of a remotely operated radio station and using its computer 
equipment to download child pornography.  With the station owner’s permission, the 
police installed a silent alarm that would activate if anyone entered the station.  On 
April 11, 2006, the police responded to that alarm and arrested Blakeslee as he exited the 
premises.  When they arrested him, the police found Blakeslee in possession of a thumb 
drive and a USB cable.  Search warrants were obtained for the thumb drive and for a 
computer and floppy disks found in Blakeslee’s residence, as well as for a computer he 
was having repaired at a local computer store.  The radio station owner permitted the 
authorities to search the station computer for evidence.  Those searches revealed 
Blakeslee’s use of the radio station’s computer to access and download over a thousand 
images of pornography; there were dozens of images of child pornography on the thumb 
drive, including several that were exact matches to images found on the station 
computer’s hard drive; the computer in Blakeslee’s residence contained 1,105 child 
pornography images, some of which were, again, exact matches to files on the computer 
hard drive from the station; there were over one hundred child pornography images on 
the floppy disks in Blakeslee’s home, many of which matched images on the computer 
found in his home; and there were child pornography images on the computer that 
Blakeslee had left for repair at a computer store.   
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In December 2007, Blakeslee was indicted for receipt of child pornography in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2) and 2252A(b)(1) (“Count 1”), and two counts of 
possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 
2252A(b)(2) (“Counts Two and Three”).  Subsequently, the government and Blakeslee 
entered a plea agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) 
whereby Blakeslee agreed to plead guilty to Count One of the Indictment, admitting that 
he knowingly received child pornography and material containing child pornography that 
had been shipped and transported in interstate and foreign commerce.  Under that 
agreement, the government stipulated that Blakeslee would serve the mandatory 
minimum sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment, to be followed by a term of supervised 
release for life.  Pursuant to the agreement, Blakeslee was free to “withdraw from the 
agreement and withdraw any guilty plea entered pursuant to [that] agreement” if the 
sentencing court refused to accept the plea or imposed a sentence greater than that agreed 
to by the parties.  (App. at 26.)   
In July 2009, Blakeslee appeared before a Magistrate Judge and, after a full 
colloquy, pled guilty pursuant to the plea agreement.  The Magistrate Judge issued a 
Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) recommending that the District Court “enter an 
Order adjudging the defendant guilty of the offense.”  (Id. at 8-9.)  The Magistrate Judge 
also ordered a presentence investigation and the preparation of a presentence 
investigation report (“PSR”).   
Based on the R & R, the District Court accepted Blakeslee’s guilty plea and 
scheduled a sentencing hearing.  At the hearing, the District Court advised the parties 
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that, upon review of the PSR, it was “going to reject the plea bargain.”  (D.I. No. 109 at 
2-3.)1
Mr. Blakeslee, what that means to you is that you must now discuss with 
[your attorney] the options available to you.  You can stand by your guilty 
plea and understand that the Court will sentence you to any lawful sentence 
the Court might choose to impose and that that sentence might be a greater 
sentence than that which you bargained for.  If you do not wish to exercise 
that option, then you’ll have the option of withdrawing your guilty plea and 
setting your case for trial.  You need not decide that today. 
  The District Court noted that it had previously sentenced Blakeslee and that he had 
appeared before the Court on multiple occasions for violations of his supervised release.  
The Court noted that it was “not at all confident that a 15-year sentence, [to which the 
parties agreed, met] the sentencing objectives.”  (Id. at 7)  The Court also expressed 
doubt that Blakeslee, who would, if he served 15 years in prison, be 80 years of age when 
released, would cease his lifelong pattern of “prowling, of stalking young girls, and of 
accessing child pornography sites,” a pattern which had, with time, “become increasingly 
dangerous.”  (Id.)  After explaining its rejection of the plea agreement, the Court 
continued: 
(Id. at 9.)  Through his counsel, Blakeslee ultimately requested a jury trial after the 
District Court indicated that it did not want its “discretion limited” when an amended plea 
agreement with another binding sentence was offered to the Court.  (D.I. No. 110 at 3.)2
                                              
1 Citations to “D.I. No. 109 at __” reference Item No. 109 on the District 
Court’s docket and are to the transcript of the September 29, 2009 hearing at 
which the District Court rejected the plea agreement between Blakeslee and the 
government.  
   
2 Citations to “D.I. No. 110 at __” reference Item No. 110 on the District 
Court’s docket and are to the transcript of the October 8, 2009 hearing at which 
Blakeslee chose to go to trial.    
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At trial on the three original charges, the government sought to introduce evidence 
that some of the images found in Blakeslee’s possession matched images from a “known 
series” of child pornography, meaning images that had previously been confirmed to 
contain the images of actual children as opposed to, for example, young looking adults 
posing as children.  (App. at 143, 374.)  That evidence included Exhibit 40, a report from 
the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (“NCMEC”) indicating that 34 of 
the images found in Blakeslee’s possession were matches to “known series” images.  
That exhibit also confirmed an interstate nexus in the case because the children in the 
“known series” were “literally from all around the world.”  (Id. at 160.)  To authenticate 
Exhibit 40, the government relied upon the testimony of Special Agent Kyle, an 
instructor at the FBI’s investigative training unit at Quantico, Virginia.  Kyle’s testimony 
consisted of:  1) a description of his over 20 years of experience investigating child 
pornography cases, resulting in familiarity with over “1500 titled subjects” (Id. at 141);  
2) a synopsis of his knowledge of the procedures at NCMEC and his past involvement 
with that agency, which included receipt of training at NCMEC, providing the NCMEC 
with “known series” information, and teaching NCMEC personnel about newly 
discovered “known series” (Id. at 143-44, 241, 249-52);  3) an assertion that, in other 
cases, he had been called to testify regarding known series in which he had participated in 
recovering the children portrayed, as well as about other known series based on his 
“knowledge base” and “extensive experience” in the area of child pornography (Id. at 
143);  and 4) a claim that he had previously testified as an expert on every “known 
series” at issue in the Blakeslee case (Id. at 251).  Blakeslee objected to Exhibit 40 as 
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inadmissible hearsay, but the District Court determined that Kyle’s testimony was 
sufficient to establish its admissibility “under the business record exception.”  (Id. at 
252.)   
Blakeslee was found guilty of all three counts.  Later, on April 29, 2010, a PSR 
was prepared and provided to the parties but, based on Blakeslee’s objections to the PSR, 
a PSR with an addendum was provided to the parties on July 12, 2010.  That addendum 
reflected Blakeslee’s argument that he was entitled to a two-level reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 because he acknowledged 
involvement in the offense and only went to trial to raise a technical argument rather than 
to assert innocence.  The addendum also showed that the probation office stood behind its 
conclusion that Blakeslee should not receive a two-level reduction in his Guidelines 
offense level because he had tried to plead guilty “in the context of a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) 
wherein he attempted to dictate the sentence imposed by the Court” and, once that plea 
and associated 15-year sentence was rejected, he decided to go to trial.  (PSR Addendum 
¶ 13.)   
At the sentencing hearing, Blakeslee again argued that he was entitled to a two-
level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.  The District Court determined that 
Blakeslee had not accepted responsibility and should not receive credit for such an 
acceptance.  Blakeslee also requested a variance under U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4, due to his 
alleged vulnerability in prison stemming from his age, illnesses, and the nature of his 
charge.  In response, the District Court noted Blakeslee’s mental health diagnosis and 
determined that his bipolar disorder neither excused his conduct nor “warranted either a 
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departure or a variance from the guidelines.”  (App. at 351.)  The Court also found that 
Blakeslee’s physical health problems were typical of his age and that those, combined 
with his age, did not “make him extremely at risk any more than any other defendant.”  
(Id. at 336.)  To the extent that Blakeslee’s argument alluded to him being at greater risk 
when imprisoned because of the nature of the charges of which he was convicted, the 
Court noted that that was “always problematic” but found that he was not at greater risk 
than anyone else who enters a penitentiary, institutions which, the Court noted, are 
“committed to rehabilitating and protecting the people in their care.”  (Id.)   
Addressing “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” (Id. at 354), the Court 
said that Blakeslee had been “found guilty by a jury of collecting thousands of vile 
images … [of children being] raped, sodomized, pillaged, and all for the personal 
enjoyment of viewers on the Internet.”  (Id. at 354.)  The Court further noted that 
Blakeslee had previously been before the Court for similar illegal conduct, the difference 
being that the images had become more vile and more cruel.3
                                              
3 Blakeslee has a history of offenses related to children and child pornography.  In 
1992, he was convicted of three counts of loitering and prowling at night.  The basis for 
those convictions included peering into the homes of young girls.  In 1998, Blakeslee was 
also convicted of two counts of loitering and prowling at night after he was arrested for 
peering into a home where an eleven year-old girl and her friend were watching 
television.   
  The Court stated that, 
In 1999, Blakeslee was convicted for possession of child pornography, for which he 
was sentenced to five years imprisonment and three years supervised release.  After being 
released from prison, however, Blakeslee violated the conditions of his supervised release 
by, among other things: being found in the presence of children under the age of 18 – 
specifically a three-year-old girl – without being in the presence of an approved adult; 
possessing electronic media and computer programs and services without permission of 
the probations officer; using a computer with Internet access; associating without 
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though Blakeslee had never been convicted of violating a child, he “cannot dispute that 
he has followed children, attempted to lure children, and even violated the orders of [the] 
Court by associating with children while on supervised release.”  (Id. at 355.)  The Court 
recognized that the Guidelines range for pornography offenses was both “harsh” and 
“high,”(id.), and that, in some instances, it was unduly so.  Nevertheless, the Court 
rejected Blakeslee’s arguments, finding that the “guidelines range sentence is necessary 
in this case to punish, deter, promote respect for the law, reflect the very serious nature of 
[Blakelee’s] conduct, and protect the public from future crimes.”  (Id. at 356-57.)  The 
Court sentenced Blakeslee to 360 months of imprisonment on Count I, and two terms of 
240 months on Counts II and III, all to be served concurrently, a life term of supervised 
release, and a $300 special assessment.   
On August 26, 2010, Blakeslee timely filed a notice of appeal.   
II. Discussion4
On appeal, Blakeslee argues that the District Court: 1) erred in declining to 
sentence him to fifteen years’ imprisonment in accordance with the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea 
agreement associated with the guilty plea first accepted and then rejected by the District 
Court; 2) abused its discretion when, at trial, it admitted the NCMEC report; 3) 
committed clear error when it found that he had not accepted responsibility for his actions 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
authorization with an 11-year-old girl; trespassing; and attempting to lure a child.  On 
account of those acts, Blakeslee’s supervised release was revoked three times, and he was 
sentenced to additional terms of imprisonment. 
4 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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such that a two-level offense reduction was applicable; and 4) abused its discretion in 
imposing a sentence of 360 months of imprisonment.  We address each argument in turn. 
A. The Plea 
We review for abuse of discretion the District Court’s decision to reject a plea 
agreement.  United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 521 (3d Cir. 2010). 
Before accepting a guilty plea, a court must address the defendant in open court, 
inform him of and confirm his understanding of, among other things, the right to plead 
not guilty and the right to a jury trial and that, if the court accepts the guilty plea, he is 
waiving those trial rights.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(A)-(N).  A court must also ensure 
that a defendant has both knowingly and voluntarily accepted the guilty plea.  FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 11(b)(2).  Under Rule 11, a court may then “accept the agreement, reject it, or 
defer a decision until the court has reviewed the presentence report.”  FED. R. CRIM. P. 
11(c)(3)(A).  A district court need not accept a guilty plea and the associated agreement 
simultaneously.  United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 674 (1997).  It can, instead, accept 
the guilty plea and later accept or reject the agreement.  Id. 
If a court ultimately rejects such a plea agreement, the court must do the following 
in open court:  
(A) inform the parties that the court rejects the plea agreement;  
(B) advise the defendant personally that the court is not required to follow 
the plea agreement and give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the 
plea; and  
(C) advise the defendant personally that if the plea is not withdrawn, the 
court may dispose of the case less favorably toward the defendant than the 
plea agreement contemplated.    
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FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(5)(A)-(C).  If a court accepts a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, 
such as the one at issue here, it is bound by the provisions of that agreement.  United 
States v. Bernard, 373 F.3d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 2004).  
Blakeslee contends that, by originally accepting his guilty plea, the District Court 
also accepted the plea agreement’s fifteen-year stipulated sentence.  Accordingly, he 
posits that we must vacate both the trial verdict and sentence and remand “for sentencing 
in accordance with the plea agreement.”  (App. Br. at 15.)  He is mistaken.  The 
acceptance of the plea did not equate to an acceptance of the agreement.  Hyde, 520 U.S. 
at 674.  Instead, the Court was free to later reject the agreement, which it did after 
reviewing the PSR.  Having rejected the plea agreement, the District Court gave 
Blakeslee options consistent with Rule 11.  Thus, the District Court did not err in 
substance or procedure in rejecting the plea agreement and allowing Blakeslee to go to 
trial.     
B. Admission of the NCMEC Report 
We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s interpretations of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.  United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 220 (3d Cir. 2000).  If the 
District Court’s interpretation of the relevant Federal Rules of Evidence is legally sound, 
we review its application of those rules, including the admission of evidence, for abuse of 
discretion.  Id.; United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 98 (3d Cir. 2002). 
Blakeslee argues that the District Court erred in admitting the NCMEC report 
because the report is hearsay and the testimony provided to support its admission as a 
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business record under F.R.E. 803(6) was insufficient.5
The only exception suggested by the government was and is the business records 
exception set forth in Rule 803(6).  For the NCMEC report to be admissible under the 
business records exception, it must be authenticated by “the custodian [of the record] or 
other qualified witness.”  F.R.E. 803(6).  A qualified witness “need not be an employee 
of the [record-keeping] entity so long as he understands the system” and can testify as to 
the “foundational requirements of Rule 803(6).”  United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 
657 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal citations and quotations omitted.)  The foundational 
requirements are:  
  The NCMEC report is indeed 
hearsay because it was an out-of-court statement “offered into evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted[,]” namely that some of the images found in Blakeslee’s possession 
belonged to a “known series” of child pornography images.  F.R.E. 801(c).  As such, the 
NCMEC report was inadmissible unless a hearsay exception applies.  F.R.E. 801; 802.   
(1) [t]he declarant in the records had personal knowledge to make accurate 
statements; (2) the declarant recorded the statements contemporaneously 
with the actions that were the subject of the reports; (3) the declarant made 
                                              
5 The business records hearsay exception is stated in F.R.E. 803(6):  
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, 
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or 
from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the 
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular 
practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record 
or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other 
qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 
902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of 
information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
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the record in the regular course of the business activity; and (4) such 
records were regularly kept by the business. 
 Unites States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 403 (3d Cir. 1996).    
Here, the District Court accepted the testimony of Agent Kyle as adequate to 
admit the NCMEC report under the business records exception.  We agree with Blakeslee 
that that was error.  Despite Agent Kyle’s expertise and general familiarity with NCMEC, 
he neither made the record nor had the personal knowledge of its creation necessary for 
him to testify as to the elements required by the Rule.  Therefore, admission of the 
NCMEC report was an abuse of discretion by the District Court. 
Even so, that error was harmless.  An error is harmless if it is “highly probable that 
the error did not affect the judgment.”  Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 284 
(3d Cir. 1976)(citation omitted).  “[W]e will affirm a District Court’s evidentiary ruling, 
even if it is erroneous … if it is highly probable that the error[] did not affect the outcome 
of the case.”  Hirst v. Inverness Hotel Corp., 544 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal 
quotation omitted).   
Here, in addition to the NCMEC report, the government presented a large quantity 
of evidence establishing that the images were of real children and that there existed an 
interstate nexus in Blakeslee’s case.  That evidence included witness testimony as to the 
ages of the victims depicted and binders containing thousands of child pornography 
images from which the jury could determine that those images were of actual minors. 6
                                              
6 Another witness, Trooper Trusal, worked on the Blakeslee case and testified 
that he “wouldn’t say there were any [children] over 16 … some as young as 
maybe seven or eight.”  (App. at 192.)   
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See United States v. Rayl, 270 F.3d 709, 714 (8th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the material 
presented included “images of prepubescent children, and the jury was free to make its 
own conclusion as to the age of the children depicted”).  The evidence also included 
testimony that Blakeslee downloaded images from the Internet to the radio station 
computer, which established the interstate nexus requirement.  United States v. 
MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that “the Internet is an 
instrumentality and channel of interstate commerce.”)  The NCMEC report, then, only 
served to corroborate voluminous other admissible evidence reviewed by the jury.  Thus, 
it is “highly probable” that the NCMEC report did not affect the outcome of the case, and 
its erroneous admission was harmless.    
C. Acceptance of Responsibility 
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s interpretation of the 
Sentencing Guidelines and review for clear error its factual findings related to applying 
the Guidelines.  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 653, 655 (3d Cir. 1991).  “A defendant who enters a guilty plea 
is not entitled to an adjustment under [U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1] as a matter of right.”  U.S.S.G. 
§ 3E1.1 app. n. 3.  It is Blakeslee’s burden to establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he has “clearly accept[ed] responsibility for his offense.”  U.S.S.G. 
§ 3E1.1(a); see also United States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 193 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that 
defendant “bears the burden of establishing … that he or she is entitled to the reduction”); 
United States v. Muhammad, 146 F.3d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1998) (same).  The sentencing 
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judge’s finding with respect to acceptance of responsibility “is entitled to great 
deference.”  U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 app. n. 5.   
Blakeslee argues that he should have been granted a two-level reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 because, even though he 
withdrew his guilty plea and chose to proceed to trial, he only did so because the District 
Court had rejected the plea agreement’s stipulated sentence.7
Blakeslee entered a guilty plea and then, when his plea agreement was rejected, 
withdrew it and chose to go to trial.  At trial, Blakeslee challenged some of the factual 
underpinnings of the charges, such as whether some images on the thumb drive and the 
home computer were the same, whether the images depicted actual children instead of 
adults who looked like children, and whether there was a possibility that someone other 
than Blakeslee was responsible for downloading the pornographic images seen on the 
radio station computer.  The record suggests that Blakeslee did not accept his guilt as 
required by U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 but, rather, throughout his trial attempted to cast doubt in 
the mind of the jurors as to whether he, in fact, had committed the charged acts.  Such 
behavior is inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility.
  His argument is not 
persuasive.   
8
                                              
7 Blakeslee also contends that docket entries do not reflect that he moved to 
“withdraw his plea at any time” and that thus he should be awarded credit for 
acceptance of responsibility.  This is an untenable position.  Blakeslee’s request 
for a jury trial has the same effect as withdrawing his guilty plea.  
  Therefore, the District Court 
8 Application Note 2 states that an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility: 
[I]s not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its 
burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, 
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did not err in denying Blakeslee a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility 
under U.S.S.G § 3E1.1. 
D. Reasonableness of Sentence Imposed 
We review the District Court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion, 
looking first for procedural error and then examining the sentence for substantive 
reasonableness.  United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2008).  With 
respect to sentencing-related factual findings, our review for abuse of discretion is 
effectively a review for clear error.  See id. at 217 (“[I]f the asserted procedural error is 
purely factual, our review is highly deferential and we will conclude there has been an 
abuse of discretion only if the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous.”).  A 
sentence will be upheld as substantively reasonable unless no other reasonable sentencing 
court would have imposed the same sentence for the reasons provided.  United States v. 
Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 774 (3d Cir. 2010). 
Blakeslee contends that the sentence imposed by the District Court was the result 
of procedural error because the Court failed to adequately consider the 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 3553(a) factors – specifically his age, mental and physical health issues, and 
                                                                                                                                                  
and is convicted … Conviction by trial, however, does not automatically 
preclude a defendant from consideration for such a reduction. In rare 
situations a defendant may clearly demonstrate an acceptance of 
responsibility for his criminal conduct even though he exercises his 
constitutional right to a trial. This may occur, for example, where a 
defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to 
factual guilt… . 
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 App. n. 2. Blakeslee’s contentions at trial were not limited to 
issues unrelated to his factual guilt.  
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vulnerability to abuse in prisons.  He also argues that the sentence imposed was 
unreasonable because the Court failed to consider the relevant sentencing factors and 
because the Guidelines range for his type of offense is too harsh and so the District Court 
should have departed from the calculated range.   
As an initial matter, it is uncontested that, after rejecting Blakeslee’s argument that 
he was entitled to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the District Court properly 
calculated the Guidelines range as being 292 to 365 months’ imprisonment.  Furthermore, 
it is clear from the record that the District Court then “gave meaningful consideration to 
the § 3553(a) factors.”  United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 218 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Specifically, the Court addressed and rejected Blakeslee’s arguments for leniency based 
on his age and mental and physical conditions.  The Court also took note of the harshness 
of the Guidelines range but found that, despite prior sanctions by the Court, Blakeslee’s 
conduct had not improved, and had instead become more dangerous and vile.  Thus, the 
Court determined that the Guidelines range was appropriate and sentenced Blakeslee at 
the upper end of that range to “punish, deter, promote respect for the law, reflect the very 
serious nature of [Blakeslee’s] conduct, and protect the public from future crimes.”  
(App. at 355-56.)   
In light of the circumstances of this case, the District Court was well within its 
discretion in rejecting Blakeslee’s arguments and in sentencing him within the Guidelines 
range.        
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III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment and sentence of  the 
District Court. 
